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Education's Promise
Sam Wineburg
Laurel Currie Oates
This is a story with at least two parts. In the first part,
Sam Wineburg, a Professor of Educational Psychology at the
University of Washington, tells his story, the story of instruction
in the United States, beginning with one revolution, the scientific revolution, and ending with another, the cognitive revolution. In the second part, Laurel Oates, the Director of Legal
Writing at Seattle University School of Law, tells our story, the
story of legal education and, in particular, legal writing, and
how both have been affected by these revolutions.
SAM'S STORY

Not too long ago, I asked eight high schools seniors and
eight historians to verbalize their thoughts as they read aloud a
series of historical documents, including diary entries and excerpts from an autobiography, a formal deposition, a newspaper
report, a letter of protest, a selection from a historical novel,
and an excerpt from a high school textbook.' Now the students
whom I asked to do this task were not ordinary kids. They were
some of the best and the brightest. All had GPAs above 3.5, and
all had received high scores on the SAT. Similarly, the historians were a prestigious group. Four of the eight were Anmericanists, and four were "non-Americanists" who specialized in
other areas.
In analyzing the students' and historians' protocols, I discovered three things. First, the students and historians rated
the trustworthiness of the items very differently. While three of
the eight students gave the excerpt from a high school textbook
the highest rating, all of the historians gave it the lowest. Why?
Because the textbook contradicted a point made in both British
and Colonial documents and, when eyewitnesses who are adverSamuel S. Wineburg, Historical Problem Solving: A Study of the Cognitive
Processes Used in the Evaluation of Documentary and Pictorial Evidence, 83 J. ED.
PSYCH. 73 (1991).
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saries agree, that's a pretty good indication that something did
happen that way. But what about the students? Of those giving
it the highest rating, one called it "straight information," and
another said it was an "objective account." For these students,
the textbook and not the eyewitness accounts emerged as the
"primary source."
Second, even when the students and historians had the
same scores on a pretest and gave documents the same ratings,
they did so for very different reasons. Consider, for example, the
explanations that Jan, a historian, and Darryl, a student, gave
in selecting a 1859 depiction of Lexington Green as the most accurate representation of what really happened.
Jan's explanation:
You get the idea from all of the descriptions, whether American or British, that the British soldiers . . . couldn't control themselves. It was a riot-you've heard of the Chicago
police riot, well this was a redcoat riot. In all these [other
paintings] the British have maintained their lines, and you
get the idea that they did not maintain their lines from the
accounts . . . . The thing is that none of these [paintings]
tell us how the battle started . . . . It's possible that [the
1859 depiction] is the most accurate because they seem to
be firing from a building and there was some indication
they would be firing from buildings. However, that was only
from the British side . . . . Now given the fact that there
are quite a few women in this, and no women are mentioned in the document, that is something of a problem, but
it also implies that it's kind of a citizenry army, and so that
may be accurate.
Darryl's explanation:
[The 1859 depiction is most accurate] because it gives sort
of . . . an advantageous position, where they are sort of on
a hill and I presume somewhere over here is a wall I
guess . . . . The minutemen are going to be all scrambled,
going to be hiding behind the poles and everything, rather
than staying out here facing them . . .You know there's got
to be like a hill, and they're thinking they got to hide behind something, get at a place where they can't be shot besides being on low ground, and being ready to kill. Their
mentalities would be ludicrous if they were going to stand,
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like, here in [the 1775 depiction], ready to be shot.2
While in her explanation Jan refers to the written documents five times, trying to reconcile what she has read with
what she sees in the picture, Darryl makes no references to the
written documents. His only reference is to another picture. In
addition, while Jan was troubled by the fact that the picture
contained details not mentioned in the written documents, Darryl based his decision on a detail, the presence of the hill, that
had not been mentioned or alluded to in any of the written documents. Thus, while Jan's selection seems to have been based
on specific details about the battle as presented in the written
documents, Darryl's seems to be have based on his own 20th
century notions of battlefield encounters.
Finally, the historians and students handled not knowing
very differently. Thrown into unfamiliar territory, the historians
could find routes and pathways because they knew how to use
the disciplinary equivalent of a compass. Their expertise lay not
in what they knew, but in what they were able to do when they
did not know. They could cope with confusion while the students, in the absence of a clear answer, floundered.
The question, of course, is why the students did not do better than they did. Why is it that they rated secondary sources
as more reliable than primary sources? That they based their
decisions on their personal experiences rather than the documents before them? That they couldn't handle problems that
didn't have clear answers?
We begin our search for answers with a brief historical excursion, going back to the early part of this century to discuss
E.L. Thorndike, the father of the modern field of educational
psychology and testing, continuing to his disciple, B. F. Skinner,
and then talking about how the traditional views of behaviorism
have been challenged by what has been called the "cognitive
revolution."
Writing in 1910, Thorndike sought to establish a science of
human learning that
. ..would allow us to tell every fact about everyone's intellect and character and behavior, would tell the cause of
every change in human nature, would tell the result which
every educational force would have. It would aid us to use
2

Id. at 79.
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human beings for the world's welfare with the same surety
of the result that we now have when we use falling bodies
3
or chemical elements.
If you wanted to study learning in 1910, you started not
with students in classrooms, but with animals. Now other people had studied animal learning and had described how animals, in facing a problem, reacted in many of the same ways
that humans react: they look at what confronts them, sometimes
they resort to trial and error, but at other times, a bright cat or
dog will sit back and -

well-

think!

Nonsense, said Thorndike, animals have insights as frequently as do rocks. What we call "insight" is nothing more than
the outcome of a behavior that has been stamped in. To prove
this, Thorndike took a group of five cats and placed them in a
"problem box" where, if they happened to press on a lever, they
would be released from the box and rewarded with a little piece
of fish. How did learning go on? It was a slow but predictable
process. Listen to Thorndike's description:
When put into the box the cat shows evident signs of discomfort and of the impulse to escape from confinement. It
tries to squeeze through any opening, it claws and bites at
the wire; it thrusts its paws out through any opening and
claws at everything it reaches. It does not pay very much
attention to the food outside but seems simply to strive instinctively to escape from confinement. The cat that is clawing all over the box in her impulsive struggle will probably
claw the string or loop or button so as to open the door.
And gradually all the other unsuccessful impulses will be
stamped out and the particular impulse leading to the successful act will be stamped in by the resulting pleasure (the
piece of fish), until after many trials, the cat will when put
in the box immediately claw the button or loop in a definite
4
way.
The cat would paw everything in the cage and then, by
chance, hit the lever and be released to a place where the fish
awaited. When placed back into the cage, some cats put two and
two together. Press the lever, door opens, and voili: smoked
3 E. L. Thorndike, The Contribution of Psychology to Education, 1 J. ED. PsCYH. 5, 5
(1910).4 t -ALDINE
JONICH, THE SANE PosiTvmST: A BIOGRAPHY OF EDWARD L. THORNDIKE
(1968).
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salmon. For other cats, the dumb ones, it took 10 or 12 trials
before they got the trick. But regardless of how "smart" the cats
were, the process was simple and wonderfully flexible: Simply
create stimulus-response bonds through practice and rewards.
And if the process was good enough for cats-and could produce
scientifically demonstrable results-why was it not good enough
5
for children?
So this is what learning in school became. Reading was no
longer a process of partially understanding difficult texts, of
reading in a one-room schoolhouse with a more able peer something that one couldn't master on one's own. No, this was an age
of Frederick Taylor's scientific management when the number of
steps a custodian took in sweeping two rooms and the number
of hand motions per sweep could be charted with a stopwatch,
graphed, predicted, and controlled.6 Thorndikianism and Taylorism were a stimulus-response bond made in heaven. Learning to
read became a process like any other: start with letters, then
progress to words, then sentences, then paragraphs, then chapters, then books. It was like building a brick wall. Each stimulus-response bond was a brick, which was fitted together with
other stimulus-response bricks, layer by layer, until the wall
was built.
Having as their motto, "Substitute science for the rule of
thumb, substitute science for tradition, substitute science for
philosophy," Thorndike's disciples sought precise measurements
of every school task imaginable, from spelling to penmanship,
from reading to writing, from math to science, breaking each
task into its smallest constituent parts. 7 From Thorndike's office
at Columbia University's Teachers College, an army of freshly
minted Ph.D's bent on reforming a tradition-bound educational
system established laboratories of statistics and psychological
measurement in universities, "efficiency bureaus" in state departments of education, and research bureaus in city school districts. And then there were the curriculum developers and the
test developers. Curricula were redesigned and textbooks rewritten to present material in carefully sequenced gradations. The

5 For a more detailed description of these experiments and Thorndike's views, see
Chapter 2 in THEORIES OF LEARNING (Gordon H. Bower & Ernest R. Hilgard eds., 5th ed.
1981)
6 See, e.g., RAYMoND E. CALLAHAN, EDUCATION AND THE CULT OF EFFICIENCY (1964).

7 Clifford, supra note 4.
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Adventures of Huckleberry Finn in the 6th grade? No. We know
that it is an 8th grade book!
From the 1920s to the 1950s, Thorndike's behaviorism provided the lens through which we viewed education in this country. To be sure, there were dissenting voices-for example, the
Gestaltists and some humanistic psychologists 8-but the folks
who made our tests and developed the scope and sequence
charts for our reading programs were largely Thorndikians. But
where were the shinning results? If our way of educating was so
right, why were the Russians the ones launching a satellite to
orbit the earth? Why did Sputnik bear a hammer and sickle and
not the stars and stripes?9
But you see, this was the wrong way to think about it. It
was not, the university psychologists told us, that our theories
of learning were wrong. The problem was that we were not applying those theories correctly. If we, the teachers in classrooms,
would only listen, we could turn schools around in an instant. If
researchers, using the principles of behaviorism could teach pigeons - yes pigeons, birds whose only claim to intelligence is
that they know when we have just finished washing and waxing
our cars-to play Ping-Pong, then teachers should be able to use
the same principles to teach children to read, to write, and to do
math.
Yes, it was we, the teachers, who were lagging behind. Listen to B.F. Skinner, writing in the late 1950s. After describing
his research with pigeons, Skinner says:
From this exciting prospect of an advancing science of
learning, it is a great shock to turn to that branch of technology which is most directly concerned with the learning
process-education.1 0
If, by following a linear, rational process of breaking each task
into its component parts, teaching each part in turn, and not
progressing until the previous part had been mastered, pigeons
could be taught to do things that no one would have imagined,
why should it be any different, said Skinner, for "rats, dogs,
monkeys, and human children and most recently human

s See, ag., MAX WERTHEIMER, PRODUCTIVE THINKING (1945).
9 ARTHUR BESTOR, EDUCATIONAL WASTELANDS (1953).
10 B. F. Skinner, The Science of Learning and the Art of Teaching 24 HARVARD EDUc.

R 86 (1954).

Education's Promise

1997]

psychotic subjects."11
Skinner was a practical visionary. Teaching was not the
"one-on-one" shaping and reinforcing that you can do in a carefully controlled laboratory setting. The complexity of shaping 35
breathing, pulsating, perspiring children was mind boggling.
Since the pupil is usually dependent upon the teacher for
being right and since many pupils are usually dependent
upon the same teacher, the total number of contingencies
which may be arranged during, say the first four years of
instruction, is of the order of only a few thousand. But a
very rough estimate suggests that efficient mathematical
behavior requires something of the order of 25,000 contingencies. In the frame of this reference, the daily assignment
in mathematics seems pitifully meager.12
What to do? Recall that the "contingencies" Skinner speaks
of, 25,000 of them, are Thorndike's pieces of fish: rewards that
you need to produce an error-free performance. How were teachers to run around the room simultaneously giving out gold stars
and good girl/good boy stamps to cement every single bond that
needed to be cemented? There was only one answer. Replace the
teacher with "teaching machines," that is,
[d]evices that present carefully designed material in which
one problem can depend upon the answer to the preceding
and where the most efficient progress to an eventually com13
plex repertoire can be made.
These devices, crude hand-cranked boxes with moving paper
"programs," would do the ultimate to error: they would be so exact, so precise in their apportioning of subject matter, that error
would be programmed out of existence. Listen again to Skinner's
words-a proclamation of an end to the reign of error:
Additional steps can be inserted where pupils tend to have
trouble, and ultimately the material will reach a point at
which the answers of the average child will almost always
14
be right.
Almost always being right! Now this was no ordinary theory.
This was an incredibly practical theory. Not only did it tell us
"

Id. at 89.

Id. at 91.
13 Id. at 95.
14 Id. at 95. (Emphasis added)
12
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how a child learned, but it also told us how we should teach:
State clear objectives, break down complex behaviors into their
constituent parts, and make guided practice a part of every lesson. In addition, with its emphasis on error reduction, Skinner's
theory even told us where we should pitch our questions: make
them easy, but not ludicrously easy. Strive, the researchers told
us, for about an 83% success rate.' 5 And, even if we didn't have
teaching machines, we could still adapt. There were programmed instruction booklets: go at your own pace, do a frame, look
at the answer, and move on, brick by brick, layer by layer.
At first, few seemed concerned by the cracks in the system.
Those who criticized the behaviorist model were considered
naysayers, "romantics" who saw teaching as an art, something
16
ineffable, unable to be spoken about except in poetry or song.
But the questions these critics asked weren't being answered.
For example, the behaviorists had a difficult time responding to
Noam Chomsky's 1959 review of Skinner's book, Verbal Behavior.17 How did we learn language according to the behaviorists?
By trial and error, just like Thorndike's cat. The baby begins to
make a sound, not quite knowing what that sound means: ah
ahp ahp. The mother hears, "APPPPPP"? Could that be my precocious one-year-old telling me that she wants. . .yes, that's
what it is, AHP, yes, an APPLE! And, before the child knows
what is happening, the delicious red thing is thrust into her
hand, and, lo and behold, a stimulus-response has been formed.
Say AHP, and you get this juicy fruit. The bond is stamped in
just as mightily as the lever/fish connection was for Thorndike's
cats. But wait, Chomsky said, if this were true, if language was
a behavior that resulted from our direct confrontation with the
environment, thousands upon thousands of individual bonds
built up by experience, how is that we can comprehend language
we have never heard before, how can we comprehend words that
are not even words?
To prove his case, Chomsky turned to Lewis Carrol's
"Jabarwacky."is
Twas brillig and the slithy toves did gyre and gimble.
15 Barak Rosenshine and Robert Stevens, Teaching Functions, Chapter 3 in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON TEACHING (Merlin C. Wittrock
16 GILBERT HIGHET, ART OF TEACHING (1950).
17

ed., 3d ed. 1985).

B.F. SKDINER, VERBAL BEHAVIOR (1957).

18 Norm Chomsky, A Review of B.F Skinner's Verbal Behavior, in STRUCTURE OF
LANGUAGE: READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE

(JA Fodor and JJ Katz eds 1964).

19971

Education's Promise

Now what does this mean? We have never heard the word "tove"
before, and we can't find it in a dictionary. But one thing is certain. We would never think about kissing a tove, or even getting
near one. The reason? They're "slithy," another word that appears in no dictionary.
Chomsky said we have a deep structure for learning language, that the essence of knowing is not in knowing all the
parts, but in having an understanding of the whole. Think about
our four-year-olds. Their vocabulary is, to say the least, limited.
And yet, they can make linguistic transformations so sophisticated that we've yet been able to program a computer to make
them. 19

Moreover, think about how we learn our first language. Our
parents talk to us not with single words, but in sentences. As
children, our understanding is a mix of both things we know
and don't know. It is anything but the careful, stepwise progression that we have in ALM Second Language. And yet, though
few of us ever learn a second language, we all learn our first
one.
OK, say the behaviorists, maybe there is a little problem
with language. But the theory works with other types of learning. If you want children to learn to read and write, teach them
the behaviors step-by-step. But then we began to notice other
leaks in the dike and pretty soon there were too many to ignore.
No longer was it a particular application of behaviorism that
was being challenged, but its core. From Thorndike to Skinner,
and from programmed instruction to the basals and workbooks
that we have today, the basic premise was that any complex behavior could be broken down into a very large number of very
small steps. We could then create a "learning hierarchy," help
kids master each of the steps, and, when had they mastered all
of them, it would all "snap together."20 But would it? That's what
the German psychologist Max Wertheimer, who came to the
United States before the war but only published his findings in
1945, wanted to find out.
Take a moment and try one of Wertheimer's most famous
problems, given to fifth graders in dozens of American elementary schools. 21 Wertheimer told children to do the following three
19 See MORTON M. HUNT, THE UNIVERSE WITHIN: A NEW SCIENCE EXPLORES THE
HUMAN Mm-D (1982) OR JOHN T. BRUER, SCHOOLS FOR THOUGHT (1993).
20 ROBERT M. GAGNE, CONDITIONS OF LEARNING (1981).
21 WERTHEIMER, supra note 8 at 41.
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division problems: 321 + 671 + 35 divided by 5; 540 + 689 + 390
divided by 6; and finally 213 + 213 + 213 divided by 3.
What Wertheimer found was that children dutifully executed the appropriate routines for multiplication and division,
right down to the last problem, for which they carefully added
up 213 three times (639), drew a long division bracket, divided
639 by 3, and, lo and behold, got the answer of 213. The children could multiply and add correctly. Each brick was structurally sound. The problem was that the children could not use the
brick to build a wall let alone a house or a castle. What do I
mean? The children saw 213 + 213 + 213 and proceeded to put
it into three columns, three plus three equals six, three more is
nine; one plus one is two and one more three; two four six, okay,
now draw the brackets. 639 and then divide by 3, and wow,
look! 213? No? Really? How did that happen? Neat! What a coincidence. The problem was that it is no coincidence. If you understand the core relationships between the four operations,
multiplication as repeated addition, the reciprocal relationship
between multiplication and division, you needed to do no computation. You saw it. It was there as plain as day. It was a deep
understanding-not magic, not a coincidence-but the way the
structure of knowledge worked. Unfortunately, it was only the
odd fifth-grader, and for that matter, the odd adult, who saw
this relationship. For most, the bricks of knowledge never
"snapped into place."
Let's not go overboard. Behaviorism did have its successes.
In teaching basic skills, for example, decoding in reading and
basic computational skills in arithmetic, it achieved stunning
successes, often with children for whom little success was expected. But it faltered in taking kids beyond the basics to those
ways of thinking and knowing that are increasingly demanded
of a work force that has virtually eliminated the assembly line
in favor of the "work team." Kids could often do the basics, as
the following famous, or should I say infamous, bus test question on a 1987 National Assessment of Education Project
22
(NAEP) exam showed.
An army bus holds 36 soldiers. If 1128 soldiers are being
bused to their training site, how may buses are needed?

22 For a different version of the same critique, see JEROME BRUNER, THE PROCESS OF
EDUCATION (1962).
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Seventy percent of the students who worked this problem did
the long division accurately. However, the most common answer
among 17-year-olds, 29% of the kids who sat for the test, was 31
remainder 12. As commanders of this unit, they would order 31
remainder 12 buses. Only 23% gave the correct answer: 32
buses. Now there are many plausible explanations to why this is
so, but the larger issue is clear. Kids who can do all the parts,
solve all the tiny bits, have a tough time putting it all together.
Although school is supposed to "add up," it doesn't-not only for
our kids but also for ourselves. How many of us are like the students math educator Marilyn Burns interviewed who, when
asked about why they used a particular procedure, answered
"that's how we did it last year."23 The essence of learning was in
its rules: knowing meant knowing a rule. Unfortunately, though,
our knowledge wasn't flexible. If we knew the rule, we could
solve the problem. However, if we didn't know the rule, we were
lost. We could do the problems in our workbooks but not the
24
ones that we confronted in our own lives.

And the problem wasn't just in math, but in other subjects
as well. In the video, "A Private Universe," a National Science
Foundation researcher asked 21 Harvard undergraduates and
professors why it is warmer in the summer than it is in the
winter, a question that is discussed at at least three different
points in the typical elementary and secondary curriculum and
that is covered in most college physics courses. Despite this instruction, most of the undergraduates and professors answered
the question incorrectly, discussing the distance between the
Earth and the sun and other factors rather than discussing the
25
way light hits the Earth.
As the leaks in the system became harder and harder to ignore, people began to think about learning in very different
ways. Instead of talking about learning in terms of behaviors,
researchers began talking about it in terms of cognition. Gone
were the references to stimulus-response bonds, learning hierarchies, and the elimination of error. Researchers were now talking about schemata, mental models, and the construction of
meaning.
23 Marilyn Burns, Teaching "What to do in Arithmetic vs. Teaching "What to do &
Why," 43 EDUC. LEADERSHIP 34 (1986).
24 See also, Alan M. Schoenfeld, When 'Good" Teaching Leads to Bad Results, EDUC.
PsCYHoLoGIST (1985).
25 A Private Universe (Pyramid Film and Video 1986).
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It is this new way of thinking about learning that we are
referring to when we talk about the cognitive revolution. 26 And
it has been a revolution both in the sense that it asks us to
think about things in an entirely new way and in the sense that
the old structures were not dismantled in an orderly manner. In
addition, the revolution is not yet complete. There are still many
institutions and individuals who are fighting actively against
the cognitivist approach. But the national initiatives we hear
about, NCME, NBPTS, HOLMES, NEW STANDARDS, have
embraced it.
So what exactly is it that these national initiatives are embracing? At one level, it is a change in what we mean by "knowing." In behaviorism, knowing meant knowing the rule. But in
cognitive psychology the essence of knowing is understanding.
Because it is impossible to learn a rule for every problem and
situation that we will encounter, we need to develop schemata
or mental models that allow us to go beyond the information
given. Learning must prepare us to be flexible, teach us how to
bend, prepare us to make do when we don't have all the pieces.
It must prepare us to speculate, not guess; to estimate, not randomly choose.
Thus, we are in search of a new metaphor. If learning is not
as Skinner or Gagn6 would have it, a wall made up of millions
of subskills, what is it? What if, instead of a wall built brick by
brick, learning is more like a picture that comes slowly into focus? Instead of starting with the pieces, we start with the
whole, seeing first its general shape, then the primary lines,
and then the details.
If we use this metaphor, our notions of knowledge change
dramatically. No longer are the connections linear; they are associative. The cognitive connections that we create are less like
the nice, ordered connections of a scope and sequence chart and
more like a Faulknerian novel, where connections are made
sideways and forward, jumping ahead and circling behind, and
where, to finally achieve some understanding of the whole, we
must live through moments of utter confusion with only our
faith that perseverance will finally pay off. Knowledge is not
simple or one dimensional. It is complicated, looping and somersaulting, associating and connecting in ways that not even the
most sophisticated computer program can duplicate.
26

For a more complete history of cognitive science, see HOWARD GARDNER, THE

MiND's NEW SCIENCE (1984).
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And what if learning comes about not by doing something
once, but by doing it over and over as we reflect carefully on it?
If this is true, the essence of learning would not be what we can
do in the single-timed essay test for 40 minutes, a cultural form
still used in statewide writing assessments and college classrooms, but our ability to take that good but flawed first draft
written in 40 minutes, and stick with it, through multiple
drafts, stick with it, even when we hate it, and taking that first
draft through a process that will make it a finished piece. If this
is the case, then our response to error cannot be quick, we cannot be hasty, quick get the eraser - put an end to that sentence; no, error is the clue to success. Error, when we detect it,
cannot be dismissed until it discloses its lesson to us. 2 7 This, I
would assert, is the essence of the reforms. It is an invitation to
think about what it means to err. To err and go on. To err and
invite that error to stay around and be one's teacher.
If we see these reforms as just the latest brainchild of someone with a pocket panacea, if we think about the call for reform
as just another set of techniques, for example, requiring the use
of portfolios instead of multiple choice tests or performance assessments instead of true/false tests, we miss an opportunity to
rethink what knowledge is.
If we have been brought up to think of knowledge as fixed
and known, where do we learn to cope with the uncertainty that
I am advocating? This whole approach, designing large, challenging tasks for youngsters and teaching them not to recoil
from error and confusion but to work through it, will not be
easy; this is not a "throw away your crutches in the one-day
workshop" way to teach. In changing our role from an error detector to hinter, from arbiter of right and wrong to endower of
skills and thoughtfulness, from a test grader to a diviner of
signs, we lose our old and trusted supports. The tests that come
with the multiple choice unit reviews, all of these come to look a
bit less adequate than they did before.
It means that we give assignments in our English classes,
our social studies classes, and our science classes that ask students to reflect on the first draft of work they handed in. What
was good about it and why? And what would they want to fix?
What risks did they take? What did they try that they weren't
sure they could do? Students "self assessment" should not be an
21 Dennie P. Wolfe, Assessment as an Episode of Learning" (in press) and Samuel S.
Wineburg, TS. Eliot, Collaborationand the Quandariesof Assessment (in press).
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add on or "extra credit." We should give as much weight to our
students' "reflections" as we to do the math assignments, the essays, and the document evaluations. If we don't, students will
simply dismiss them. We don't just "pick up" how to reflect on
our work. It is a highly refined, deeply practiced skill. When we
take risks, we are bound to err. That is the price we pay. But
there is an alternative to denying error. Instead of blotting it
out, instead of running from it, we can look at it, we can confront it, we can-strange as it may seem-celebrate it. When a
risk we take ends up in a botched activity, we can say to our
students, "Look, this is what I wanted to happen. This is the
risk I took. And it bombed. How could I do it differently? What
advice could you give to me?" In treating error this way, we
model for students a lesson in intellectual courage.
OUR STORY:

Our students are Sam's students, only a few years older.
They are, most of us would agree, the brightest of the bright.
Not only do they have high high school GPAs and SAT scores,
but they also have high undergraduate GPAs and LSATs. They
are, however, also products of the behaviorist legacy. Whether
they are in their twenties, thirties, or forties, most of them were
taught not only reading and math but also English, science, and
history one brick, one layer, one wall at a time. Knowledge, even
in college, was knowing the rule, coming up with the correct
answer.
So what happens when these students come to law school?
Are they simply asked to do more of the same? To learn, rule by
rule, the rules of law? Or, are we asking them to do something
different? Do we mean it when we tell them that law school will
teach them not the law but how to think like a lawyer?
Like behaviorism, the case method of legal education has its
roots in the "scientific revolution" of the late 1800s. Dissatisfied
with the lecture method and eager to bring more prestige to the
study of law, Christopher Columbus Langdell believed that lawyers should be trained in the same way as biologists, chemists,
and physicists. Instead of reading textbooks or sitting through
lectures, they should study the discipline's "corpus." Thus, while
biology students studied plants and animals, identifying, analyzing, and classifying them, law students studied judicial
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opinions. 2
Unlike behaviorism, though, the case method did not, at
least on the surface, have as its focus the development of bonds
between stimuli and responses or an obsession with the elimination of error. While practices varied from classroom to classroom,
most law professors were not so concerned with teaching rules
as they were with teaching students to read carefully, to extract
the rules and key facts, and to make arguments. As Steven
Friedland found in his recent study, most professors have as
their goal improving their students' thinking. 29 Professors want
their students, when confronted with a new case, to be able to
make sense of it, when confronted with a new fact situation, to
be able to make each side's arguments. To use Sam's language,
they want to give their students a disciplinary compass.
"Ah ha," you say, "so law schools have been using the 'new'
cognitivist model all along." Like every thing else in law, the answer is yes and no. Yes, law schools do view knowledge as more
than just knowing the rule and, yes, they do try to help students develop new schemata. How do you identify the legally
significant facts? How might you frame the question before the
court and its holding? What are the policies underlying the
court's decision? The schemata that law schools help their students develop are, however, extremely limited. Although students learn schemata for reading cases for class, they do not, for
the most part, learn schemata for reading cases as advocates.
Although they develop schemata for answering exam questions,
they do not develop schemata for answering questions posed by
clients or courts. We give our students compasses, but these
compasses work in only limited types of terrain.
In addition, at least in some courses, the approach is more
like that of the behaviorists than the cognitivists. For example,
in some civil procedure and evidence courses, students learn the
rules but not how and when to apply them. Similarly, in some
upper division courses, students learn doctrines but not how to
manipulate them. And then there is the way in which some
professors manage their classrooms. While they may be on the
right track in seeking to bring their students, through classroom
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29 Steven I. Friedland, How We Teach: A Survey of Teaching Techniques in American
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questioning, into the "discourse community," the community
that they present is often an extremely hostile one.
So what about the teaching of legal writing? Have those of
us who teach legal writing adopted the behaviorist model or
have we, like the other law school professors, leaned more towards the cognitivist model? The answer is that, at least in the
seventies, we tended to favor the behaviorist approach. In most
of the early research and writing courses, research and writing
was broken down into its component parts and each part was
taught separately. Thus, legal research .was taught separately
from legal analysis, and legal analysis was taught separately
from "legal writing." In addition, in teaching each of these parts,
our emphasis was on the decontextualized transmittal of information. For example, in teaching legal research, we emphasized
the names of sources, what type of information was contained in
each, and how one used and updated each source and not how a
lawyer researches a familiar or unfamiliar area of law or questions and evaluates the sources that he or she locates. Similarly,
in teaching legal writing, we emphasized the format of various
types of legal writing, for instance, objective memoranda and appellate briefs, and the "rules of good writing" rather than the
processes used by expert attorneys in thinking and writing
about a legal issue. Our teaching methods also mirrored those
being used by the behaviorists. We tended to favor wellorganized lectures over more free flowing discussions, exercises
that had "right answers" over more realistic, and more complex,
problems.
It wasn't long, however, before those of us who were teaching legal writing realized that there were serious problems with
our approach. Like the math students who could do the math
problems in their math books but who could not figure our how
many buses were needed, our legal writing students could tell
us what type of information was contained in a particular book,
the format for a question presented, and how to fix a comma
splice, but they couldn't write a good memorandum or brief.
In an attempt to stop these "cracks," in the eighties most of
us adopted the "process model" for teaching writing. At a minimum, we described the four steps in the writing processprewriting, drafting, revising, and editing-and encouraged our
students, instead of writing their papers the night before, to go
through each of these steps in sequence. In addition, many of us
began to get actively involved in the process. Instead of simply
assigning a project and then grading the final product, we began
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adding prewriting exercises and requiring first and sometimes
even second and third drafts, which we critiqued and then returned to our students for revision.
At this point, it is important to point out that our extra efforts helped. The final drafts of the memoranda and briefs were
better than they were before. They were better researched, better organized, and better written. In addition, our more able
students were able to take what they had learned in our classes
and use it to write high quality memoranda and briefs for their
employers.
The problem was, however, that not all of our students were
so "able." Even some of the students who had done well in our
30
legal writing classes seemed to have difficulty "transferring"
what we had taught them to the world of practice. We began to
hear complaints from librarians that students lacked basic research skills, from clinicians that students couldn't develop a
theory of the case, and from judges that students couldn't write
tight, well-structured arguments."
The question, of course, is why. One possible answer is that
they simply forgot what we had taught them. Although they
may have known how to write a good memorandum or brief during their first year, they forgot how to do so by their third year.
Another possible answer is that they simply did not get enough
practice applying what we taught them. In a typical first-year
legal writing program, students research and write only two or
three memoranda and one brief, hardly enough practice to
master a difficult task. Another answer is, however, that we are
still not teaching our students everything that they need to
know. Although we need to transmit information to our students
and we need to teach them writing processes, we also need to
carry through on the promise that we make to them on the first
day of school: we need to teach them how to think like lawyers.
For, until they know how to think like a lawyer, they can't write
like one.
But how do we teach our students to think and write as
lawyers? The bad news is that, at this point, no one knows for
sure. Just as law schools are struggling to find ways to better
teach their students, so are medical schools, business schools,
30 For a general discussion of transfer, that is, the ability to apply knowledge and
strategies to new situations, see R.J. Spiro et al, Knowledge Acquisition for Application:

Cognitive Flexibility and Transfer in Complex Domains, in EXECUTIVE CONTROL
PROCESSES (B.C. Britton ed. 1987)
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and graduate programs in history, psychology, and engineering.
First, we need to rethink our notions of knowledge, learning,
and error. We need to abandon the brick and wall metaphor of
knowledge with its linear connections and replace it with a picture that, with repeated and varied exposures and the help of
teachers and peers, slowly comes into focus. In addition, we
need to abandon the view of learning that values the product
but not one's reflections on the process that created the product.
Finally, we need to abandon view that error is bad, adopting instead a view that allows us to use error as an opportunity for
teaching.
Second, we need to study how expert lawyers think and
write, using protocol analyses to look at, among other things,
the types of information that these experts have, how they organize that information, how they acquire new information and
incorporate it into their existing knowledge structures, how they
31
evaluate authority, and how they make decisions.
Third, we need to look at the ways in which expert lawyers
became experts. What types of instruction and experiences did
they have? What type of mentoring or scaffolding seemed most
effective? How long did the process take? Finally, we need to
think about the ways in which we might structure our curricula
to help our students develop such expertise. Do we simply need
to tinker with our curricula or is a wholesale revision necessary?
The bottom line is that we, as some of the most interested
members of the profession, need to advocate for, support, and
participate in an open debate on the nature learning and conduct research designed to study how law students become expert
lawyers. We then need to revise our curricula and teaching accordingly, looking for ways not only to transmit information to
our students but also to help them develop ways of thinking and
writing as lawyers.
A FINAL NOTE
In closing, we would like to turn to our title. What is education's promise? Is it simply to transmit information, without error, from one generation of privileged students to the next? Or
is it much more? Can we as educators-as teachers and mentors-help our students develop the connections and strategies
that will allow them to use that information in the real world?
31 For a discussion of using protocols, see MICHAEL PRESSLEY and PETER AFFLERBACH,
VERBAL PROTOCOLS OF READING (1995).
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For example, can we help elementary school students learn how
to use addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division to solve
everyday problems, high school students how to evaluate historical documents as historians evaluate them, and law school students how to write effective memoranda and briefs not just for
us but for real clients with real questions and problems?
In addition, can we as educators keep our promise to more
students than just those who would "get it" with or without us?
Can we develop curricula and teaching methods that educate
those who are less able and those, who although very able, come
from less privileged backgrounds?
We can, we believe, keep these promises. However, if we are
going to do so, we must take chances. We need to learn how to
reflect on what has and has not worked and then take the time
to engage in such reflection. In addition, we must be willing to
discard some of our own rules-the rules of teaching that don't
seem to be working with the students in our classes. We must
be willing to throw away our crutches, the syllabi and teaching
methods that we have used for years, and construct new models,
new approaches to teaching. In short, instead of running from
our own errors in curriculum design and teaching, we need to
see those errors as opportunities for learning.

